

Doctoral Course Industrial Economics

Summer term 2022

Instructor

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Prerequisites

- Microeconomics / game theory
- Econometrics / statistics

Description of the course

In this course we look at different current research streams in industrial economics. We will introduce different topics, discuss recent research papers and current research questions. We cover both theoretical and empirical work.

This is planned to be an interactive course. Besides presentations by the instructor and exercises for the participants, the participants contribute by presenting papers in relation to the course's topics – this can include a paper of their own. We will allocate papers in the organizational meeting.

Below, you find the tentative list of topics.

Topics

- The tentative topics are:
 - Vertical restraints (price parity clauses, resale price maintenance, etc);
 - Digital sales platforms (rankings, product recommendations, hybrid platforms, etc);
 - Minority shareholdings and mergers;
 - Price discrimination;
 - Collusion.
- The references below indicate papers which we might discuss during the course. We will discuss which papers to prepare for the course in the organizational meeting.

Credit points and successful participation

- Successful participation requires
 - being present during the lectures and participate,
 - working on the exercises during the course,
 - presenting paper(s) as allocated in the organizational meeting and submitting slides after the lectures.

Dates

- The course is planned to take place on 4 to 5 days.
- These are the planned course dates in May:
 - 6-7 (Friday / Saturday)
 - 13-14 (Friday / Saturday)
 - 20-21 (reserve dates, Friday/ Saturday)
- Hours of day:
 - from 10:00 s.t. up to 18:00
- We will have an organizational zoom meeting from 09:00 to 10:00 on either
 - Monday March 21 or
 - Tuesday March 22

Place

- Ideally, we will meet in Siegen – at least for part of the course. This depends on the pandemic situation. We can also talk about this in the organizational meeting.
- Place in Siegen
 - Near Unteres Schloss
 - Room: US-S 0101 or US-S 0102
 - Map:
https://www.uni-siegen.de/start/kontakt/anfahrt_und_lageplaene/lageplaene_de/lageplan_us_rgb.jpg
- If online:
 - Zoom.

How to apply

- Please write me an email (in German or English) until March 5.
 - Indicate if you cannot make one of the dates of the organizational meeting (see above).
 - Note if you have a paper related to one of the course topics that you might want to present.

References

- [1] ARMSTRONG, M. Price discrimination. MIT Press, 2008.
- [2] BOIK, A., AND CORTS, K. S. The effects of platform most-favored-nation clauses on competition and entry. *The Journal of Law and Economics* 59, 1 (2016), 105–134.
- [3] HUNOLD, M., AND STAHL, K. Passive vertical integration and strategic delegation. *The RAND Journal of Economics* 47, 4 (2016), 891–913.
- [4] JOHANSEN, B. O., AND VERGE, T. Platform investment and price parity clauses. *mimeo* (2017).
- [5] JOHNSON, J. The agency model and MFN clauses. *The Review of Economic Studies* 84, 3 (2017), 1151–1185.
- [6] JULLIEN, B., AND REY, P. Resale price maintenance and collusion. *The RAND Journal of Economics* 38, 4 (2007), 983–1001.
- [7] LE CHEN, MISLOVE, A., AND WILSON, C. An empirical analysis of algorithmic pricing on amazon marketplace. In *Proceedings of the 25th International Conference on World Wide Web* (Republic and Canton of Geneva, CHE, 2016), WWW '16, International World Wide Web Conferences Steering Committee, pp. 1339–1349.
- [8] LEE, K. H., AND MUSOLFF, L. Entry into two-sided markets shaped by platform-guided search. Tech. rep., mimeo, Princeton University.
- [9] REIMERS, I., AND WALDFOGEL, J. Digitization and pre-purchase information: the causal and welfare impacts of reviews and crowd ratings. *American Economic Review* 111, 6 (2021), 1944–1971.
- [10] ZHU, F., AND LIU, Q. Competing with complementors: An empirical look at amazon.com. *Strategic Management Journal* 39, 10 (2018), 2618–2642.