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Prof. Dr. Robert Schwager
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MAGKS doctoral course “Political Economics”, spring 2018

Topic

The course provides an analytical overview of the most widely used models in political economics. Students who want to do theoretical work in political economics will be given a collection of tools from which to choose for their own research.

In the course, students will learn to understand the logic behind results, assess the role of key assumptions in proofs, and discuss the scope and limits of the models presented. Some examples for applications in specific policy fields will also be presented.

The course is based on

Persson, T. and G. Tabellini (2002), Political Economics, Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press.

Dates and rooms

Fri., 06.04.2018 11:00-19:00, [Oeconomicum - 1.163](#)

Sat., 07.04.2018 08:00-15:00, [Oeconomicum - 1.163](#)

Fri., 20.04.2018 11:00-19:00, [Verfügungsgebäude - VG 3.106](#)

Sat., 21.04.2013 08:00-15:00, [Oeconomicum - 1.163](#)

Address:

Platz der Göttinger Sieben 3 (Oeconomicum), 7 (Verfügungsgebäude)
37073 Göttingen

Requirements

Successful completion of the course requires to solve one problem set until Fri 20.04.2018, and a second one until 14.05.2018. Groups of up to three participants may co-operate in working on the problem sets.

Outline

References to pages (p.) or chapters (ch.) in Persson, T. and G. Tabellini (2002).

I Introduction

- I.1 Purpose and scope of the course (ch. 1)
- I.2 Policy problems (ch. 2.1, 3.1)

II Median Voter Models

- II.1 Pure majority rule (p. 25, 28-30)
- II.2 Sufficient conditions for median voter equilibrium (ch. 2.2)
- II.3 Redistribution (ch. 6.1)

III Political Competition

- III.1 Office motivated politicians (ch. 3.3)
- III.2 Rent-seeking politicians (ch. 4.1)
- III.3 Partisan politicians (ch. 5.1, 5.2)

IV Probabilistic Voting

- IV.1 Continuous reaction of election outcome (p. 32-34)
- IV.2 Micropolitical foundation (ch. 3.4)
- IV.3 Lobbying (ch. 3.5)
- IV.4 Rent-seeking politicians (ch. 4.2)

V Accountability

- V.1 Electoral competition with incomplete information (ch. 4.3)
- V.2 Retrospective voting (ch. 4.4)
- V.3 Career concerns (ch. 4.5)
- V.4 Local vs. national elections (ch. 9.1.1)

VI Citizen Candidate Model (ch. 5.3)

- VI.1 Endogenous candidates for political office
- VI.2 Single-candidate equilibria
- VI.3 Two-candidate equilibria
- VI.4 Capital taxation and strategic delegation (ch. 12.3)

VII Agenda Setting and Legislative Bargaining (p. 37-38, ch. 5.4)

- VII.1 Specifying rules of political decision making
- VII.2 Agenda setting and public good supply